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veterans' history is complex: while veteranhood is predicated on past activity, it is also underwritten by present-centred and future-focused concerns around status, recognition, benefits, and commemoration.
The discussion is purposefully transnational in scope, incorporating the views of historians with a wide range of geographical and methodological interests. As several discussants note, the study of veterans can be deeply enriched by comparative or transnational approaches, although carrying out such research is not without its Second, a social history approach to veterans' history has enhanced the stories of disabled veterans, pensions, rehabilitation and reintegration.
3 Third, the cultural history of modern war has focused intensively on the construction and dissemination of veterans' memory. 4 The most important historiographical contributions to veterans' history, such as Antoine
Prost's three-volume book on interwar French veterans, focus on all three aspects. 5 However, this three-fold description is somewhat artificial, as history in general, and veterans' history in particular, does not respect such neat categorisation. Indeed, beyond these sub-fields, I would also identify specific themes that form the core of veterans' history as a research field, such as demobilization. 6 Yet veterans' demobilization processes can in turn be analysed from a political, social and cultural perspective.
[Olivier Burtin:] I do not think that veterans' history is necessarily different from any other field, but some themes are certainly more recurrent than others. Like Ángel, three sub-fields come to my mind, although they are different in scope and certainly not an exhaustive list: disability (the study of how veterans and civilians deal with warconnected ailments), 7 social policy (the study of veterans' benefits, such as pensions or healthcare), 8 and war memory (the study of memorials, commemorations, war literature, history textbooks, and so on). 9 Of course, these themes can and often do overlap.
[ [Olivier Burtin]: The short answer is that veterans are characterized by the fact that they share a common experience of war. But I would quickly add several caveats to this definition.
First and most important, their experience is always mediated by other factors such as class, race, gender, disability, generation, religion, and so on. Veterans of different wars, and sometimes even of the same war, do not necessarily identify with each other.
The highly diverse patchwork of veterans' groups that exist in countries such as the U.S.
-from the Disabled American Veterans to the Jewish War Veterans to the Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans -belies any claim of a monolithic 'veteran community'.
However, this does not mean that we should see veterans as less 'coherent and welldefined actors' than other groups, for they are not the only ones to experience these kinds of internal divides. It simply means that veterans do not speak with one voice -just like women, workers, or Asian-Americans.
Second, the answer to the question of who qualifies as a 'veteran' changes across time and space, especially in a legal sense. In the U.S., for instance, the term currently applies to anyone having served in the military for a minimum period of time regardless of whether they saw combat, whereas in the UK it is reserved to those having served in in Washington, D.C., will be very different from that of someone having been deployed for combat on the frontlines, they will both qualify as 'veteran' in the US. In other words, there is nothing self-evident about being a veteran: it is a historically constructed category, which can be more or less inclusive depending on a country's specific experience of war.
Third and last, veterans do not necessarily have a monopoly on the war experience. Depending on the conflict, other groups may also claim to have "been through" war (think of Londoners during the Blitz, for instance).The difference is that veterans were typically enlisted in a military organization, as opposed to merely being civilians engulfed in war (though again, this is not always true). This distinction between veterans and war-affected civilians is noteworthy, because it often plays a key role in determining the situation of the former group after war's end. To make a crude but useful generalization, it is possible to say that the more veterans have a credible claim to being the only group affected by war, the more they will be able to obtain generous benefits from the state and to enjoy a superior social and cultural status-which makes sense, since feelings of moral obligation towards them will naturally be higher. We can see this, for instance, by comparing the US with the UK during and after the Second World War:
the fact that British civilians greatly suffered from this war, while American ones were largely out of harm's way, helps explain why the special benefits granted US veterans were so much more generous (with the 1944 G.I. Bill of Rights, for instance) than those received by their British counterparts.
[ Germany were volunteers, whereas the vast majority of those who were deployed in the 'Border War' were national servicemen (i.e. conscripts).
[ [ 33 The level of social, generational, gender, and national differences within a given veteran population depends on the individual case in question. The extent to which they gain collective agency after the war, likewise, depends on the society they return to, the kind of war they have fought, and the politics of postwar life. These have to be all untangled for each individual case.
Generally, I have become wary of attempts at predicting outcomes for veterans, partially because I have tried, together with Martin Crotty, to construct a matrix of variables to do so. 34 It is still a useful road-map, but things quickly unravel once you move beyond two-case comparisons, of which there are some but not nearly enough. does not disqualify the historian from doing so. We must reject the notion of a closed and self-fulfilling circle of understanding and truth. So I am cognisant of the fact that as an historian and a veteran, that mine is far from the last word on war but that my dual identity enables a multi-perspectival approach to the 'Border War'.
[Grace Huxford]: A lot of our answers so far have obliquely referred to veterans' collective identity, which is an important area to analyse in greater detail. So, beginning with veterans' associations, are they a useful window to approach veterans as a whole?
[Olivier Burtin]: Veterans' groups are a very useful window into veterans' history: they provide us with insights into how veterans related both to each other and to the larger civilian population. At the same time, we should keep in mind that they are not necessarily representative of the larger veteran community. This is not surprising: after all, veterans' groups typically account for only a fraction of the total veteran population. 43 As I have said before, these groups also often advocate for one specific sub-group of veteransdefined by their disability, race, gender, or else-and therefore should not be construed to speak for all former soldiers. Neither do they necessarily speak even for all their members: as can happen in any large organization, the leadership of veterans' groups may fall into the hands of a small minority of committed activists whose interests do not align 
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In my view, as Antoine Prost argued, it is difficult to equate veterans to workers or any other 'social class'. I prefer to talk about veteran identity, rather than class.
Historically, some veterans developed a strong awareness of forming a distinct group that cut across social and national boundaries. On occasions it was said, 'Veterans of the world, unite!' However, these projects often had the purpose of concealing or dissolving much clearer socio-economic differences. European fascists, for instance, gave more prominence to the community of the war experience while condemning the class struggle.
In short, although historical actors sometimes viewed veterans as a separate class, historians should not fall into the same trap.
[Gary Baines]: I am of the view that age and generational distinctions are more useful when it comes to disaggregating veterans. The cohort of white males conscripted into the SADF between 1966 and 1989 has been called the national service generation (NSG).
Generation here does not signify the co-existence of similarly aged people as much as it denotes their sense of belonging to a group with a shared historical consciousness.
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Personal narratives fashion the macrobiography of a generation and, conversely, the generational macrobiography produces a shared consciousness that shapes the personal narratives. 50 Thus there is mediation between personal memories and those of the generational unit. Although conscripts were all white males of a similar age, they came from a cross-section of society and responded in a variety of ways to their military experience. Some were career soldiers but most were conscripts. So I do not presume that the veteran community speaks with a singular, coherent voice. they were entitled to better treatment than they received. 56 I called this an 'entitlement group'. 57 This choice of words has proved somewhat confusing to some readers. In English 'entitlement' can be used as a synonym for 'status', while I meant to distinguish claims to special treatment from their institutionalization. What I tried to capture is that in the Soviet case the sense of entitlement they shared allowed veterans to act in concert even if they did not have an organization or arguably even did not share a sense of identity as veterans (an 'imagined community', to use another overused term). Eventually, and for fairly complex contextual reasons, this uncoordinated mass movement was successful and a legal status was instituted in 1978: the entitlement community had become a status group. 58 These terms were originally developed for the Soviet context, where greater restrictions on self-organization and expression applied than in democratic contexts, but they also proved productive for our comparative work. The biggest conceptual issue we are struggling with in our multi-national comparison at the moment is one particular aspect of status which I had neglected somewhat in my earlier work: the fact that the immediate community the veterans are embedded in might recognize their special status even if the state does not (as was often the case in the Soviet Union). Or the locals might scoff at veterans despite the fact that there was state discourse honouring them (as was sometimes the case in China). We try to capture this distinction by the terms 'horizontal'
and 'vertical' status. After that, the experience of being a veteran also changed. Historicizing all these processes of change from a long-term perspective is something that partially remains to be done. The American historian Jerry Lembcke has argued that PTSD is a socially constructed category whose meaning is only partly derived from its medical context, and that it has mutated from a diagnostic category to a social trope. He contends that the seductiveness of PTSD caused some US veterans to embrace it as an identity and their comrades to assign it as a badge of honour. 64 Accordingly, they were viewed not only as 'victims' but as 'heroes'. This badge was worn by those who were said to have fought hard and experienced "real" war. PTSD was no longer regarded as a mark of failed masculinity but rather that of the brave soldier who had been on the frontline in perhaps the ultimate display of typically heteronormative masculinity. Whether victims or heroes, returning soldiers appropriated the symptoms of PTSD and a war-story biography that conformed to what they thought family and friends would expect to see and hear. 65 Lembcke organized pilgrimages to former battlegrounds in Europe, as a way both for their members to visit places they had been to during the war, and to build partnerships with other veterans' groups abroad.
[Gary Baines]: At this point, I would merely wish to return to the concept of mnemonic community which is a useful vehicle for understanding veteran agency in shaping and disseminating memories of their war. Collective memories do not arise spontaneously nor take shape independently of such agency. They are born and shaped by agents, whom we might call "memory makers" or "memory bearers", that include cultural brokers, public intellectuals, teachers, and politicians who are instrumental in the public construction of memory. They select, modify, negotiate and reify particular versions of the past. These agents employ the cultural tools of language and narratives to make meaning. These interpretative codes play a significant part in shaping the views of the past and present that bind the members of a mnemonic community together. They comprise two elements:
the schemata, the temporal narrative structure in which individuals construe their memory, and the script, which is composed of existing preconceptions and opinions on issues that pertain to the memory in question. 67 Individuals learn to conventionalize, structure and narrativize their memories in accordance with the dominant social mores and beliefs which prevail in the individual's different mnemonic communities. 68 They relate to the group's shared experiences and memories, commonalities from which identities and narratives are constructed that articulate the individual's self-perception in relation to others. Such constructions are, in turn, contingent upon the reactions of the dominant socio-cultural group towards its manifestations. I believe that this paradigm might be useful in understanding the development of collective memories wherever military veterans might have access to (social) media and the public sphere.
[Grace Huxford]: As we bring our discussion to a close, I am struck by the vibrancy of the field of veterans' history, not just in the diverse case studies referenced by our discussants, but in the wider methodological or theoretical interventions that can be made through it: it encompasses the potentials and pitfalls of comparative history-writing, the 67 search for suitably inclusive models of collectivity, and the shifting societal and linguistic assumptions that underpin labels such as 'veteran'. Although our discussants have voiced a range of opinions that might inform our examination and conceptualisation of the veteran, the discussion nevertheless demonstrates the promise that veterans' history holds as a tool through which analyse the changing relationship between war and society in the twentieth century.
